Who is more pious euthyphro and socrates

At his trial, as all of Plato 's readers would know, Socrates was found guilty and condemned to death. This circumstance casts a shadow over the discussion. For as Socrates says, the question he's asking on this occasion is hardly a trivial, abstract issue that doesn't concern him. As it will turn out, his life is on the line.

Euthyphro is there because he is prosecuting his father for murder. One of their servants had killed an enslaved person, and Euthyphro's father had tied the servant up and left him in a ditch while he sought advice about what to do.

When he returned, the servant had died. Most people would consider it impious for a son to bring charges against his father, but Euthyphro claims to know better. He was probably a kind of priest in a somewhat unorthodox religious sect. His purpose in prosecuting his father is not to get him punished but to cleanse the household of bloodguilt.

This is the kind of thing he understands and the ordinary Athenian does not. The English term "piety" or "the pious" is translated from the Greek word "hosion. Piety has two senses:. Euthyphro begins with the narrower sense of piety in mind. But Socrates, true to his general outlook, tends to stress the broader sense. He is less interested in correct ritual than in living morally. Jesus' attitude toward Judaism is rather similar. Socrates says, tongue-in-cheek as usual, that he's delighted to find someone who's an expert on piet—just what he needs in his present situation.

So he asks Euthyphro to explain to him what piety is. Euthyphro tries to do this five times, and each time Socrates argues that the definition is inadequate. Impiety is failing to do this. Socrates' Objection : That's just an example of piety, not a general definition of the concept. Socrates' Objection : According to Euthyphro, the gods sometimes disagree among themselves about questions of justice. So some things are loved by some gods and hated by others.

On this definition, these things will be both pious and impious, which makes no sense. Impiety is what all the gods hate. Socrates' Objection: The argument Socrates uses to criticize this definition is the heart of the dialogue. His criticism is subtle but powerful. He poses this question: Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because the gods love it?

To grasp the point of the question, consider this analogous question: Is a film funny because people laugh at it or do people laugh at it because it's funny? If we say it's funny because people laugh at it, we're saying something rather strange. We're saying that the film only has the property of being funny because certain people have a certain attitude toward it. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked.

For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.

But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?

I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.

But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished? Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not? Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when? And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them.

For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? But they join issue about the particulars-gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true? Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder.

How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live. It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very dear indeed to you. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. For granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.

But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither.

Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? Why not! But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say? We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.

We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods. I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies?

Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this.

And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?

Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?

Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.

I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledge by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him.

But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one theophiles is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other osion is loved because itis of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence-the attribute of being loved by all the gods.

But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel and what is impiety? I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them,seem to turn round and walk away from us. Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancesto Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where theyare placed because I am a descendant of his.

But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move. Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.

Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour.

Tell me, then-Is not that which is pious necessarily just? And is, then, all which is just pious? And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger.

But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet Stasinus sings-. I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.

But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation. Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd.

I suppose that you follow me now? That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent? Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides.

In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.

Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men. For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things.

For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so? I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses? And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs? In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods? And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given?

Note: Socrates also notes that we are told the gods have much the same kinds of disagreements that Euthyphro has with his family pp. So appealing to the gods offers little help. Note further: Although Socrates says a little about the difficulty determining just what the gods might like or dislike p.

Piety is what all the gods love; impiety is what they all hate. Instead, this definition only identifies an attribute or effect of piety. At this point, Socrates steps in: "I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety.

Identify a more extended notion of which it is a part a genus. Then specify how it is different from the other parts of that more extended notion supply a differentia. Piety is that part of justice which attends to the gods.