How can parliament investigate government activity

If they are to be effective, they must be independent of the governments they are auditing. There have been dark suspicions that in at least two Australian states recently the Auditors-General have been selected in the expectation that they would not inquire too deeply into some dubious government activities. It is therefore important that auditors-general be appointed and if necessary removed by their parliaments, and that the government has no role in this; that they report regularly to their parliaments, and their reports cannot be suppressed by the governments; that they cover the full range of government activities, including non-departmental activities such as business enterprises; and that the parliaments ensure that they have sufficient resources to perform their tasks efficiently.

As the role of the PAC involves critical scrutiny of the government, the chair should be a member of the opposition. Looking at how these matters are dealt with in the twenty parliaments, the audit function is in fact reasonably well handled. Every one of the twenty parliaments has an auditor-general, sometimes with a more high-flown title: Comptroller and Auditor-General in the UK, Controller and Auditor-General in New Zealand. There are nevertheless some unsatisfactory aspects. In four of the six Australian states the auditor-general is appointed by the government without any involvement by the legislature or formal consultation with the opposition.

The exceptions among the states are Queensland, where the PAC is consulted about the process of selection and appointment, and New South Wales, where the PAC has the right of veto over proposed appointments. But giving these powers to a PAC may not be effective if the committee divides on party lines, and it is very regrettable that in Australia and the six states the chair of the PAC is held by a government rather than an opposition member. The situation is better in the other parliaments.

In Canada and the Canadian provinces the appointment of an auditor-general is made by the legislature upon the unanimous recommendation of a committee of the legislature. In Australia federally the Auditor-General is appointed after consultation with the PAAC, and the Auditor-General and the committee exchange lists of the priorities for audit functions.

In New Zealand the Controller and Auditor-General is appointed after consultation between the prime minister and the leader of the opposition. Not all the auditors report to the parliament. In the UK there is a second audit system called the Audit Commission, dealing with local government and health matters, and making reports on their efficiency, but the Audit Commission does not report to Parliament. A further problem is that in the UK, Canada and the Canadian provinces the auditors-general do not audit non-departmental government activities, such as business enterprises, nor do the Canadian PACs have the power to initiate their own inquiries on matters not raised by the Auditor-General.

This may seem a formidable list of problems, but in fact the audit function has on the whole been performed well. The PACs are highly regarded and membership often leads to higher office, though the tendency to give the PACs other expenditure control functions is weakening their attention to audit, particularly as some of the committee, notably those in the states and provinces, are already inadequately supported by specialist staffs. The parliamentary handling of efficiency reports is generally much less satisfactory.

All the auditors-general, except those in the UK and Queensland, make recommendations on how to improve the efficiency or value-for-money of government programs, but the parliamentary follow-up is weak. Logically such reports should be dealt with when the departmental estimates for the next year are being considered, with bureaucrats being closely questioned to ensure that corrective action has been taken where necessary, with the threat that otherwise the estimates would be reduced. Logical this may be in administrative terms, but in political terms it never happens.

A reduction in the estimates by the lower house would be regarded as a vote of no confidence in the government, and would be decided on party lines. The only systematic study of the efficiency reports is by the Public Accounts Committees, but the PACs have neither the time nor the support staff to do the necessary job over the full range of government activities, and in any case their traditional desire for unanimous reports effectively precludes them from investigating highly controversial problems, which are of course the very ones which should be investigated.

Parliamentary committees are not at all well designed to construct policies and to impose them on governments, and merely to give a committee the facts and to expect it to work out the best solution is a forlorn hope.

This is not to say that efficiency audits serve no useful purpose. They often gain considerable publicity, and it is usually not easy for a government to ignore the findings. Summing up, governments can usually be expected to react to critical efficiency audits, but parliaments do not really have an effective role in the matter. Modern parliaments are by no means always effective defenders of individual rights and liberties; indeed they often actively encroach on them.

People may look to the courts for protection, but they may look in vain. Courts certainly do have a role in controlling a government acting without legislative backing. After the election, employers were told by the government that they need no longer make payments to the Superannuation Board a decision welcomed by the employers , and that the act would be amended when Parliament met in a few months.

But even if the courts could deal with such a breach of the law, they can do nothing if an obnoxious law is valid. The supremacy of statute law ensures that a court can do no more than try to work out its meaning and then apply it as justly as possible. If there is no entrenched constitutional limitation on the power of parliament to enact laws which infringe basic human rights, the only controls are the consciences of the members of parliament and the prospect of a future election at which they may be held to account.

These are frail defences for the reasonable rights of minority groups who are unpopular with most voters. The tyranny of the majority, and the ability of a populist government to mount a scare campaign, are ever-present risks.

There will of course be pressure against such laws, from individuals, from government organisations such as a human rights commission, and from voluntary organisations such as Amnesty International.

But if the government sees political advantage in a particular bill, there is little doubt that it will pass the lower house. An upper house, if one survives, can present a barrier, but it is sometimes a weak one. The House of Lords can do no more than delay legislation if the government is determined. An example is the passage of the deplorable War Crimes Act, which was twice rejected by the Lords but still became law.

There have been many attempts to put limits on the power of governments. The Bill of Rights of was an early attempt, but it is not entrenched, and the UK Parliament is not limited by it. Unentrenched bills of rights have also been enacted in Canada and New Zealand but, being unentrenched, they can always be by-passed by the Parliament. Lord Hailsham said in Canada enacted a bill of rights in The act also protected rights such as freedom from cruel punishment or arbitrary arrest, to a fair trial, to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, to legal counsel, to an interpreter, and the right not to testify against oneself.

However, the act was not entrenched, and could be amended by the Parliament in the same way as any other act. Parliament was also specifically permitted to pass bills which conflicted with the bill of rights, provided that the bill stated that it was to operate notwithstanding any conflicts with the bill of rights.

The bill of rights did not apply to provincial legislation, and could be suspended in a national emergency, a loophole Prime Minister Trudeau used in during the Quebec troubles. All in all, this bill of rights was a weak document, and it was replaced in by a more effective charter of rights and freedoms, which was entrenched in the Constitution.

In New Zealand, the incoming Labour government was committed to a bill of rights, though it was not clear whether it was to be entrenched, and if so, how. After prolonged argument, both in Parliament and in a select committee, the idea of entrenchment was dropped, at least for the time being.

The bill of rights aimed to protect basic rights: the right of life and security of the person; democratic and civil rights; non-discrimination and minority rights; and protection from unreasonable search, arrest and detention. But it is weak in effect. Ordinary parliamentary enactments override the bill of rights whenever there is a conflict.

The Attorney-General has a statutory duty to inform the House of Representatives if a bill being considered appears to be inconsistent with the bill of rights, but if the Parliament goes ahead anyway that is the end of the matter.

The courts cannot strike down an offending act, though they are required, whenever possible, to give such an act an interpretation that is consistent with the bill of rights. There have been some bizarre cases. The ineffectiveness of an unentrenched bill of rights has led various countries to entrench such rights and freedoms, to protect them from a predatory legislature. The First Amendment to the US Constitution, passed in , set out in nine articles the rights and freedoms which were derived from the English Bill of Rights of It is of course easier for a country with an entrenched constitution to entrench a bill of rights, though the amending of constitutions is by no means easy.

The Charter is substantially the same as the Canadian Bill of Rights, with two crucial differences: it is entrenched and therefore cannot be simply changed by an act of Parliament and it applies to both federal and provincial legislation.

Such a declaration may last for five years, and may be re-enacted. Discover the concepts that underpin our democracy in these adaptable classroom activities. Investigate how the party system operates in Australia, and how government is formed in Parliament with this classroom activity. View all. Discover how bills — proposed laws — are introduced, debated and voted on in the House of Representatives by turning your class into a Parliament and doing it yourselves!

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Directly to the content Directly to the main navigation Directly to the service menu. Political Organization Organization chart. Paragraph It is not always necessary to instigate a parliamentary inquiry to bring the required facts of a matter to the fore. Informants before an investigating committee are under the obligation to testify truthfully. If an informant refuses to testify and the committee feels that such refusal is not justified, it may request the Federal Administrative Court to impose a coercive penalty.

Civil servants cannot plead being bound by official secrecy. They may, however, be heard in camera, in which case all those present are committed to keep the testimony confidential. The deliberations of an investigating committee are confidential. Hearings of informants and experts are, however, open to media representatives unless there are - in analogy to court proceedings - grounds to exclude the public. It is to be distinguished from Parliamentary Hearings and Commissions of Enquiry, which serve to provide information to Members of Parliament in their function of legislators.

A Political Mission: Monitoring Certain Aspects of the Government's Work It is their task to scrutinise the way the Federal Government conducts its business regarding specific matters and to investigate actual conditions and events. Establishing Investigating Committees Investigating committees can only be set up by the National Council but not by the Federal Council.

Obligation to Testify Truthfully Informants before an investigating committee are under the obligation to testify truthfully.